Upgrading, Downgrading, Linking, Innovating: Microfinance Development Strategies - A Systems Perspective - by Seibel, Hans Dieter
Economics and Sociology 
Occasional Paper No. 2371 
·. 
UPGRADING, DOWNGRADING, LINKING, INNOVATING: 
Microfinance Development Strategies 
- A Systems Perspective -
by 
Hans Dieter Seibel 
June 1997 
Rural Finance Program 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
The Ohio State University 
2120 Fyffe Road 
Columbus, Ohio 43210-1099 
• 
Abstract 
In the transition process from financial repression to a prudentially deregulated financial 
system, an increasing number of developing countries are becoming concerned about access of 
the rural and urban masses to microfinance. Only viable institutions with sound practices, 
which mobilize their own resources and cover their costs from the interest rate margin, can 
respond to the increasing demand for microsavings, microcredit and microinsurance services 
on a sustainable basis. Three major approaches contribute to the development of a system of 
microfinance: reform of the policy environment; institutional transformation; and instrumental 
innovation. In this framework there is a wide variety of institutions that have to undergo major 
adjustments to play their role effectively as financial intermediaries for the microeconomy: 
commercial and development banks; formal local banks and semiformal financial institutions 
under private, cooperative, community or local government ownership; credit NGOs; and 
informal financial institutions. Contingent upon the policy environment, the institutional 
infrastructure, and the degree of market integration, there are four major strategies of 
institutional transformation: institutional adaptation, or downgrading, of formal financial 
institutions; institutional enhancement, or upgrading, of nonformal financial institutions; 
linking formal and nonformal financial institutions; and, in the absence of a sufficient number 
of adaptable formal and nonformal institutions, infrastructural innovation: establishing new 
microfinance institutions. In each case, sound financial practices appropriate to the institution 
and its market are essential. There is no single best approach that can be simply replicated 
without regard to the unique situation of a country or region. 
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1. The Core Problem of Financial Systems Development 
In recent years a growing number of developing countries have embarked on reforming and 
deregulating their financial system. They have transformed their financial institutions into 
effective intermediaries and extended financial services to a wide array of its population. In the 
process a new world of finance has emerged which is demand-led and savings-driven, 
conforming to sound criteria of effective financial intermediation. By gradually increasing the 
outreach of their banking system some developing countries, among them Indonesia as an 
example (Binhadi 1995), have substantially alleviated poverty. 
Yet in many other developing countries financial systems have not performed well, the 
institutional infrastructure is inadequate, institutions are not viable and financial services are 
not sustainable. Theirs is a world of finance which is supply-led and credit-driven, adhering to 
principles of social banking. The economy in these developing countries has usually remained 
depressed. Even where growth-oriented policies were of some success, vast segments of the 
population were excluded from access to formal finance. 
Many governments, donors and experts have chosen to ignore new insights into the crucial 
importance of financial systems development (McKinnon 1973), savings mobilization (UN 
1984; USAID 1991), sound credit markets (Adams, Gonzcilez-Vega & Von Pischke 1990; 
Adams, Graham & Von Pischke 1984; Von Pischke 1991) and financial deregulation 
(McKinnon 1991). They have continued to provide subsidized targeted credit to the 
microeconomy through development finance institutions (DFls). The combined emphasis on (i) 
targeting, (ii) subsidization, (iii) agriculture, (iv) credit only, and (v) development banking has 
failed to contribute to the viability of financial institutions and the sustainability of financial 
systems. Despite numerous government credit programs and credit guarantee schemes (mostly 
a cure of symptoms rather than the disease), the financial requirements of the ever-growing 
market of microentrepreneurs and small farmers, women and the urban and rural poor were 
not adequately met. 
The result was that the poor had no access to finance, institutions lost their money and 
governments ended up in external debts not matched by productivity increases. This in turn has 
restricted the absorptive capacity of both the institutions and their customers for external credit 
while at the same time fueling the spiral of productivity losses, defaulting and hightened 
government requests for additional funds to fill the gap. In the end the poor in many 
developing countries have remained poor, financial institutions are sick and governments are 
bankrupt - though there are notable exceptions with important lessons for the future. 
Recognizing the ill consequences of financial repression, developing countries are now 
embarking in increasing numbers and at varying degrees of determination on prudential 
deregulation. In the process, they are facing a dual core problem: 
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- on the one hand the lack of viability and sustainability of national financial institutions 
and services accessible to all segments of the population including those in the 
microeconomy; 
- on the other hand the absence, or inadequate number, of local financial institutions 
(which may be member-owned, community-owned or privately owned), which are so 
prominent in the financial systems of many industrial countries. 
This core problem is closely related to the issue of 
- supply-led finance of national financial institutions, with their exorbitant transaction costs 
and loan losses; vs. 
- demand-led finance of local financial institutions and national institutions with a local 
delivery network, 
related in turn to an inappropriate regulatory environment, an inadequate financial 
infrastructure, ineffective institutional strategies, and unsound banking practices. The financial 
system thus failed in its three major functions: financial resource mobilization, financial 
intermediation and allocation of scarce resources to the investments with the highest marginal 
rates of return. As a result, potential savings went uncollected; institutional intermediation 
between savers and borrowers was inadequate; and resources that only the market can 
efficiently allocate were misallocated by government bureaucracies and government-controlled 
development banks, frequently with donor support and expert advice. 
While inadequacies of the financial system have affected all economic sectors and segments of 
the population, their impact has been most acutely felt by the rural and urban masses in the 
informal sector and those below the poverty line. To guide their future operations governments 
and donors need a microfinance policy, with a microsavings, a microcredit and perhaps a 
microinsurance component, centering on local financial institutions or services under 
conditions of prudential deregulation and supervision. Such a policy must depart from the 
experience that only the balanced growth of the savings, investment and repayment capacities 
of the microsector will lead to a steady increase in its absorptive capacity for external credit; 
and that only sustainable financial services provided by viable financial institutions with 
adequate capacities within a market economy and a favorable policy environment will 
contribute to that balanced growth. These are concerns which in recent years, and particularly 
in the context of the Microcredit Summit in February 1997 in Washington DC, have led to an 
avalanche of new microfinance literature (Almeyda 1996; Berenbach & Churchill 1997; 
Bouman & Hospes 1994; Garson 1996; Getubig et al. 1997; Gentil & Hugon 1996; Germidis 
et al. 1991; Ghate 1992; Hoff et al. 1993; Hulme & Mosley 1996; Johnson & Rogaly 1997; 
Krahnen & Schmidt 1994; Kropp & Clar de Jesus 1996; Otero & Rhyne 1994; Quinones 1997; 
Remenyi 1991; Rock & Otero 1997; Schneider 1997; Seibel 1996, 1997a-c; Von Pischke 
1991; Wbster & Fidler 1996). Through the DEVFINANCE@LISTS.ACS.OHIO-STATE.EDU 
network of the Rural Finance Group in the Department of Agricultural Economics at The Ohio 
State University, it has also led to hightened debates on the internet as a new medium of 
communication. 
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2. The Conventional Policy Framework: a Systems Perspective 
Targeted preferential credit has been one of the major instruments of regulated finance in 
developing countries. Overregulation has led to financial repression at several systems levels: 
(i) The government as banker, entrepreneur, policymaker, planning and executing 
agency has taken control over the total financial, economic and political system. This 
has led to a breakdown in accountability. 
(ii) On the policy framework level, the government has repressed the real sector 
through price controls and quotas and the financial sector through monetary practices 
governed by political concerns rather than budgetary restraint and market rules. Con-
troled exchange rates and agricultural prices undermined market mechanisms. Fixed 
interest rates prevented financial intermediation. Fiscal policies were neglected. 
External debts replaced domestic resources. 
(iii) The legal framework has suppressed financial deepening by preemption of 
decisions by government bureaucracies, legal barriers against new banks and branches, 
and restrictions of savings mobilization and financial intermediation through 
institutional specialization and narrow collateral requirements. 
(iv) A supervisory infrastructure was deemed unnecessary in a tightly regulated 
environment. 
(v) Governments repressed the growth of the institutional infrastructure by submitting 
institutions to objectives defined through centralized planning processes and by 
preventing the emergence of formal local financial institutions, which were at best 
relegated to the semiformal and informal financial sectors. 
(vi) Credit products were differentiated by target groups, areas and production purposes 
defined by the state. Savings products were mostly undifferentiated. 
(vii) Banks were required to follow administrative procedures set by Government, 
confining services to a minimum and shifting the bulk of transaction costs to borrowers. 
(viii) Contract terms and conditions were determined by administrative expediency. 
(ix) Credit-driven and supply-leading finance has focused on target beneficiaries rather 
than customer demands. 
(x) Strategies centered on credit channeling rather than resource mobilization and insti-
tutional viability, with financial repression the overall result. (Seibel 1994a, 1996) 
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3. Microfinance for the Microeconomy: Financial Systems Development Strategies 
Microfinance, comprising microsavings, microcredit and microinsurance, is geared to the vast 
and expanding market of small farmers, tenants, small and microentrepreneurs, women and the 
urban and rural poor. This is a highly differentiated and segmented market, with segmentation 
serving the function of adaptation of terms and conditions to unique conditions on unintegrated 
markets (Garson 1996). It reaches from the very poor to small enterprises which give 
employment to the poor. In some countries this market comprises as much as 60-80 % of the 
population. There is a wide range of demands for financial services, comprising access to 
savings deposit facilities, credit, capital markets and insurance services. Microsavings, the 
forgotten half of rural finance (Vogel 1984), is of fundamental importance for local and 
domestic resource mobilization: (i) for the microentrepreneur in terms of his self-financing 
capacity; (ii) for the institution in terms of financial self-reliance. Savings are health food for 
both microentrepreneurs and banks. More sick enterprises and financial institutions can be 
cured by savings promotion than by any other remedy. Enhancing the savings capacity of 
financial institutions in developing countries and, indirectly, in microenterprises is perhaps one 
of the greatest challenges - to be promoted through the diffusion and exchange of experience 
about successful savings mobilization strategies and products in various developing countries. 
Only financial institutions with local delivery systems can effectively provide microfinancial 
services to the broad masses of the population. Microfinance may be promoted through five 
strategic approaches: 
(i) transformation of the total financial system comprising monetary policy reform, 
transformation of the financial infrastructure, and instrumental innovation in coordination 
with fiscal and other measures geared to macroeconomic stability, reforms of the real 
sector and, if necessary, political and administrative reforms geared to accountability; 
(ii) reform of the policy environment comprising the policy framework proper - with a 
particular emphasis on interest rate policy-, the legal and the supervisory framework; 
(iii) institutional transformation geared to the development of the financial infrastructure 
with particular emphasis on local financial services and institutions; 
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(iv) instrumental innovation geared to sound banking and sound or best practices1 
through appropriate financial products, procedures and services, terms and conditions of 
financial contracts and adequate risk management; and 
(v) poverty lending, comprising direct and indirect approaches. 
Policy reform, institutional transformation and instrumental innovation cannot all be 
initiated at the same time; in many developing countries they may be contingent upon prior 
political reform. Prudential reform and adjustment is a gradual process which does not proceed 
along a predetermined path. Carried out by reformers whose experience evolves during that 
very process, it requires careful adaptation to an extremely complex set of internal and external 
factors. The development of local and microfinance must be accorded high priority in total 
system reform. 
Policy reform, with an emphasis on prudential deregulation, is the most direct approach to 
financial and economic transformation, but may not be immediately feasible for political or 
other reasons. There also is a better chance of success for policy reform if its path has been 
prepared by successful institutional and instrumental experimentation. At the international level 
reforms of the policy environment are most appropriately promoted by the IMF and the World 
Bank, with regional development banks in a supportive role. Local and microfinance will best 
evolve in a deregulated environment but requires deeper measures than mere policy changes. 
1Best practices or sound practices? Originally introduced by the World Bank, the term best practices has 
gained wide recognition. It is an inappropriate term, as we learned from the organizational sciences during the 
1960s that in complex organizations there are only satisficing, no optimal (or best) solutions. It is also a 
dangerous term in that it may lead to a search for universal solutions and to careless replication without regard to 
given circumstances. 
Take formalization of MF/s (ie., the transformation of nonformal into formal MFis that fall under the 
banking law) as an example: in all likelihood an effective strategy in a prudentially deregulated environment 
where MFls are free to charge intererest rates that cover their costs; but probably not so under conditions of 
financial repression when formal institutions are barred by interest rate ceilings from covering the costs of 
microloans. As a result, microentrepreneurs will either have no access to credit; or they bear the brunt of a 
substantial transfer of transaction costs from lender to borrower. 
Or another example: Saving is a good thing for microentrepreneurs, MFls and the monetization of the 
local economy and should therefore be promoted. Is it therefore a best practice, to be disseminated through 
training and consultancy advise around the world? Well, it depends: under conditions of a running inflation, 
microentrepreneurs should be advised not to put their money in the bank. 
In this sense, none of the strategies and practices described or recommended in this paper are optimal or 
best, they are at best effective or satisfactory under conditions to be specified. Every replication requires a careful 
examination of the circumstances under which it is to be applied. When the replication concerns a complex 
strategy or approach (such as Grameen banking [cf. Todd 1996], linkage banking, or village banking), thorough 
adaptation is most likely required. The term sound practices would therefore be more appropriate. 
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Institutional transformation focusses on the institutional environment as its entrypoint, 
encompassing two system levels: structurally the institutional infrastructure and functionally 
appropriate strategies for its development. 
Instrumental innovation, which encompasses sound banking practices in terms of financial 
products, transaction cost management and interest rate margins, procedures and services, risk 
management and terms of contracts may be effectively used as a separate strategy and can 
greatly improve the institutional viability and effectiveness of formal and nonformal financial 
institutions. 
Direct poverty lending is usually contingent upon the supply of government or donor funds 
and therefore, on principle, unsustainable. This also applies to a growing number of revolving 
and credit guarantee funds supplied by donors to governmental and non-governmental agencies 
and projects. Indirect poverty lending, through appropriate institutions and products, may be 
demand-led and savings-driven. The decision as to whether or not an institution limits its 
operations to a particular target group, such as the very poor, the poor or the nonpoor, should 
be left to the institution and not be imposed by a donor. Member-based institutions owned and 
managed by microentrepreneurs, women or the poor know best what is in their own interest; 
donors and government agencies should not interfere with that decision. (Cf. Malhotra 1992) 
4. The Institutional Infrastructure of Microfinance 
There is a wide range of financial institutions, each with its own comparative advantages for 
microfinance services, including, 
• formal financial institutions which comprise 
• institutions dealing actually or potentially with microentrepreneurs and small 
farmers as customers, 
• institutions owned by microentrepreneurs and small farmers; 
• semiformal financial institutions which comprise, 
• secondary banks not supervised by the central bank 
• near-bank institutions lacking some criteria, e.g. equity capital, to fully qualify 
for bank status 
• financial institutions and credit projects run by government agencies but not 
falling under the banking act 
• projects of government agencies supported by bilateral donors with a credit 
window, e.g. in the form of a revolving fend 
• NGOs acting as financial intermediaries, operating credit windows or otherwise 
supporting savings and credit activities 
• savings and credit cooperatives not formally recognized as financial institutions 
• informal financial institutions which may be, 
• individually based and specialized such as moneylenders and deposit collectors 
• individually based and nonspecialized such as traders 
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• group-based and specialized such as rotating savings associations (ROSCAs, 
tontines) and nonrotating accumulating savings and credit associations (ASCRAS -
Bouman 1995) 
• group-based and nonspecialized such as voluntary associations or business 
associations with savings and credit activities as secondary functions. 
(Adams and Fitchett 1992; Bouman 1979, 1989; Germidis et al. 1991; Ghate 1992; Seibel & 
Damachi 1982) 
Together semiformal and informal financial institutions comprise the nonformal financial 
sector. Within that sector, savings and credit associations which are group-based informal 
financial intermediaries appear to have a large development potential that some donors have in 
recent years started to recognize. 
Nonformal (semi- and informal) financial institutions are in most cases local financial 
institutions. Two types of institutions are of particular importance, cutting across dividing lines 
between the formal, semiformal and informal financial sectors: 
• institutions dealing with microentrepreneurs and small farmers as customers (Banking 
with the Poor) 
• institutions owned by microentrepreneurs and small farmers 
(Banking by the Poor). 
Institutions dealing with microentrepreneurs as customers may be government-owned or 
privately owned. Furthermore, they may be national, regional, provincial or local institutions. 
Such institutions may either deal solely with microfinance, or microfinance may be but a part 
of its operations. There is evidence that any of them may effectively mobilize its own resources 
and provide financial services along sound banking principles with perfect or near-perfect loan 
recovery and a profit margin that permits self-sustained growth. Bank Rakyat Indonesia in 
Indonesia may serve as an example of a large government-owned commercial bank in a 
deregulated environment that mobilizes its own funds in rural areas and successfully lends to 
vast numbers of microentrepreneurs and small farmers at market rates (Patten & Rosengard 
1991; Schmit 1991; Seibel 1992e). Private sector examples are Bank Dagang Bali in Indonesia 
and Northern Mindanao Development Bank in the Philippines. 
Under conditions of repressive regulation viable and sustainable financial services may be 
offered by semiformal and informal financial institutions which are exempt from the 
impositions of the regulatory framework.· Examples of viable semiformal institutions initiated 
by local government is BKK on Java (Malhotra 1992; Patten & Rosengard 1991), LPN on 
Sumatra and several others most of which started around 1970 in Indonesia (Seibel 1989). An 
example of local financial institutions at the borderline of the formal and semiformal sectors 
are the new community banks in Nigeria, which are under their own second-tier regulatory 
authority, the National Board of Community Banks (Seibel 1994b). Technical assistance can 
greatly contribute to the establishment, expansion and enhancement of such institutions. 
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There are three major types of local institutions: 
• member-owned (cooperative) institutions; 
• community-owned institutions; and 
• privately owned institutions. 
These are mostly small local institutions, which are flexible and adaptive. Because of their 
institutional size, their sole business is microfinance. They may be formal, semiformal or 
informal, or combine two levels, as in the case of a village bank with a surrounding network of 
informal savings and credit associations as retailers. They may have great evolutionary 
potential: from informal to semiformal, from semiformal to formal, and from unit banking to 
branching-out. 
Member-owned institutions of the cooperative type can be formed by any type and number of 
people within or accross neighboring communities, including microentrepreneurs, small 
farmers, women and the poor. Membership is normally contingent upon an equity capital 
contribution but may also include other criteria (e.g. gender as in the case of a women's bank, 
occupation as in the case of a market or traders' bank) and is a prerequisite for access to the 
institution's services. In some cases such institutions are also open to non-members but at 
different terms. Depending on the legal framework provided by the wider financial system, 
formal and semiformal member-based institutions may be cooperatively owned (cooperative 
banks) or individually (as as in shareholding banks). Member-owned institutions rely fully or 
largely on their own resources, i.e. on equity and savings. Among the financially self-reliant 
institutions owned by their members are vast numbers of group-based informal financial 
institutions. Among them are the ubiquitous rotating and nonrotating savings and credit 
associations. Whether nonformal institutions can evolve into banks depends on the legal frame-
work, which is of course subject to change. 
Community-owned financial institutions may be people- or local government-based. They 
are people-based if the members of the community are either directly (through individual or 
household membership) or corporately owners of the institution. There must be a provision in 
the rules and regulations or bye-laws that the community members or its recognized 
representatives have a say in the running of their affairs. This should also be reflected in the 
perceptions of the people, who should consider the institutions as theirs. In some developing 
countries community banks are government-based, be they government-owned or government-
imposed and perceived as government institutions. In fact the dividing line between institutions 
owned by local government or by the people of the community is not always sharply drawn 
and may be as much a legal as a social issue. Similarly, while there are cases where the 
distinction between ownership by members or the community as a corporate body is legally or 
culturally clear and unequivocal, there are also many other cases where it is blurred. A useful 
quantitative indicator may be the extent to which community banks depend on government 
resources vs. savings and retained earnings as a source of funds. 
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Privately owned financial institutions are owned by one or several individuals, who are 
frequently, but not always, local people. Examples are the rural banks in the Philippines and 
Indonesia. 
Community Banks in Nigeria are an example of a crossbreed between all three types, 
combining a variable mix of member, community and private ownership. By December 1993 
there were 879 Community Banks co-owned by Community Development Associations, 
informal self-help groups and individuals (Seibel 1994b). 
5. Institutional Adjustment Strategies 
The basic principle of institutional adjustment must be appropriateness, with institutional 
viability and sustainability as lead values. Depending on the situation in a country, there may 
be one or several effective strategies. There are four major prerequisites, each related to a 
particular adjustment strategy: 
(i) Effective formal local financial institutions exist with a potential for adaptation to the 
demands of the microeconomy 
(ii) Effective nonformal (semiformal and/or informal) local financial institutions exist 
with a potential for adjustment 
(iii) Both formal and nonformal local financial institutions exist with a potential for 
adjustment and business cooperation 
(iv) There is a lack or shortage of effective or adaptable formal and nonformal financial 
institutions. 
Depending on these conditions four major institutional adjustment strategies have emerged 
offering strategic entrypoints for the development of microfinance: 
(i) Institutional adaptation (or downgrading) of banks to the local environment 
(ii) Institutional enhancement (or upgrading) of nonformal (informal or semiformal) 
financial institutions 
(iii) Linking formal and nonformal financial institutions 
(linkage banking) 
(iv) Creating new local institutions (infrastructural innovation). 
9 
None of these strategies is universally applicable, nor does any single one offer optimal 
solutions. Their appropriateness depends on local circumstances and conditions, which need to 
be carefully assessed. The interrelations between strategies and conditions, together with some 
examples, are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Appropriate institutional adjustment strategies 
Strategy 
Adapting formal financial 
institutions to the rural/informal 
sector environment 
(downgrading) 
Enhancing nonformal 
financial institutions 
(upgrading) 
Enhancing informal 
financial institutions 
Enhancing semiformal 
financial institutions 
Linking formal and nonformal 
financial institutions 
(linkage banking) 
Creating new institutions 
(infrastructural 
innovation) 
Notes: 
Conditions 
Effective formal 
institutions exist 
Effective nonformal 
institutions exist 
Effective informal 
institutions exist 
Effective semiformal 
institutions exist 
Both effective 
formal and nonformal 
institutions exist 
Absence or shortage of 
effective formal or 
informal institutions 
Examples 
ADBN, Nepal 
BAAC, Thailand 
BRI, Indonesia 
NMDB, Philippines 
Bank MBM Indon. 
Numerous NGOs 
Coop. or NGO 
banks 
Linkage banking 
projects in APRACA 
member countries 
Grameen Bank 
VBA in Vietnam 
APB in Laos 
CBs in Nigeria 
ADBN Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (a government-owned agricultural 
development bank) 
APB Agricultural Promotion Bank, Laos (a government-owned national-level 
agricultural develoment bank) 
BAAC Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, Thailand (a 
government-owned agricultural bank) 
Bank MBM Bank Maha Bogha Marga, Denpasar (the first NGO bank in Indonesia) 
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BDB 
CBs 
Grameen 
NMDB 
VBA 
Bank Dagang Bali (a privately owned commercial bank in Indonesia) 
BRI 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (the largest rural-agricultural Bank in Indonesia, 
government-owned, operating as a commercial bank) 
Community Banks, under the National Board of Community Banks as a 
second-tier regulatory authority in Nigeria 
Grameen Bank, Bangladesh (a group-based bank, mixed ownership) 
Northern Mindanao Development Bank (a private thrift bank, Philippines) 
Vietnam Bank for Agriculture (a government-owned agricultural bank) 
5.1. Downgrading:2 
Formal Finance and the Institutional Adaptation Strategy 
In virtually every developing country there are commercial and development banks with a 
potential for adjustment to the banking requirements of microentrepreneurs and the poor. To 
tap this vast potential is a major challenge. 
The prime prerequisite and at the same time crucial policy incentive for institutional 
adjustment is an interest rate regime which allows for market oriented interest rates. Banks 
must be permitted to offer attractive and differentiated interest rates to savers and to charge 
interest rates on loans which cover their fixed and variable costs, and include an adequate 
profit margin. If banks are to serve customers which differ widely in terms of service costs and 
risks, the only effective inducement for them is an adequate margin, lest they exclude the small 
farmers, microentrepreneurs and people in remote areas. In the absence of this prime 
prerequisite banks may pursue one of the following three courses: they may request an 
exemption from the central bank; they may externalize part of their costs by working through 
intermediaries with separate funding (e.g. NGOs); or they mey set up a non-bank organization 
with a separate legal personality (e.g., a limited liability company) which does not fall under 
the interest rate regulations of the banking law. However, these approaches should only be 
transitory; they are no long-term substitute for interest rate deregulation. 
Institutional adaptation of banks to the micro finance market concerns: (i) their governance 
and incentive structure; (ii) their corporate culture; (iii) their internal business and product 
policy; (iv) their financial service structure; (v) bank procedures; (vi) terms and conditions; 
21 adopted the term downgrading from the technology debate in the 1970s. Downgrading is the adaptation of 
a sophisticated technology to an environment requiring a simpler technology, e.g. the substitution ofhandtools for 
powertools in an area without access to electricity. If production is shifted at the same time to products for which 
powertools are not suitable (e.g., artistic woodcarving), there are gains from downgrading in terms of 
effectiveness as well as efficiency. In this sense, downgrading may acquire a positive connotation. 
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(vii) risk management; and (viii) the manpower and training system. For virtually all of these 
dimensions, Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BR!) may serve as a model case. 
(i) Adapting a bank's governance and incentive structure may follow any of the following 
avenues: 
• transformation of a subsidy-dependent government bank, with management and staff 
selected and rewarded according to administrative criteria, into a profit-oriented self-
reliant institution, with management and staff selected according to performance 
criteria; 
• transformation of branches into profit centers with a performance-related staff 
incentive scheme, as in the case of the so-called village units (unit desa) of Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia; 
• separation of commercial banking with big clients and social banking with small 
clients in different sections and gradual transformation of social into commercial 
microfinance, as in the case of the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) 
and the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture; 
• privatization of a government-owned bank, or its commercial section as a first step 
• transformation of branches or microfinance project offices into cooperatively owned 
local financial institutions, as in the case of ADBN in Nepal, which is currently 
transforming the financial operations of the Small Farmer Development Program 
subproject offices into Small Farmer Cooperatives Ltd. (SFCL) 
There is widespread, though not universal, consensus that government should give up its 
ownership of commercial and development banks und put it into more accountable hands. 
However, what remains controversial is whether these hands should be private, cooperative 
under direct member control, cooperative under the control of management, or either one 
depending on given circumstances or on the objectives or mission of an institution (e.g., 
maximization of profits vs. optimization of client services). An additional variant for 
government, cooperative and private banks is the separation of ownership and management, 
with management placed in the hands of a management firm which bears all costs and shares in 
the profit (as practiced by some banks in Belgium and by some credit NGOs in Guatemala 
initiated by ACT, a Belgian NGO). The strategy of some agricultural development banks (like 
the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture) to divest themselves of their microfinance operations by 
setting up a heavily subsidized Bank for the Poor for the disbursement of preferential targeted 
credit to the poor and the very poor repeates the mistakes of the past; it contravenes the 
principles of sound banking and sustainable poverty alleviation; and lacks the dynamics of 
adequately responding to the growing demands of vast numbers of the poor for a full range of 
financial services. 
(ii) Adapting the corporate culture at the local level requires an adjustment of the bank's 
material culture (such as the appearance of the bank building and its offices, types of vehicles, 
facilities such as air-conditioning); social culture (such as social background, dress code, 
language and behavior of staff as well as quality of staff-customer relations); and the bank's 
value orientation system (comprising values such as honesty and reliability, diligence and hard 
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work, innovativeness, being of service to the customer, making the bank grow). This 
customer-oriented corporate culture must be internalized through staff training and propagated 
through public relations as the bank's image. 
(iii) Adapting the banks' business and product policy requires a reorientation towards 
savings- and demand-driven sound banking. This comprises in particular an orientation of a 
bank towards institutional viability, market and customer-oriented banking and self-reliance 
through mobilization of its own funds of which savings, and perhaps retained earnings are the 
most important sources of loanable funds for MFls. This reorientation is to be operationalized 
through appropriate microsavings, microcredit and microinsurance products as well as 
reciprocal savings-cum-credit schemes which are all designed to bring the mutual business 
interests of the banks and their customers into a sound balance. 
(iv) Adapting the financial service structure of a bank may comprise four major avenues 
towards local finance: 
• extending the branch and sub-branch network; 
• the establishment of part-time offices in villages, markets or small industry sites; 
• mobile services through cars, motorcycles or bicycles; 
• full-time or part-time agents providing doorstep or other decentralized services. 
(v) Adapting procedures requires a simplification of forms and procedures, convenient 
facilities and banking hours, customer-oriented services of high quality as well as reliability 
and speed of services, creditworthiness examination and collateral requirements adjusted to the 
needs of small customers. 
(vi) Adapting terms and conditions of contracts to the requirements of microentrepreneurs 
and informal sector households comprises a differentiation of interest rates and other terms 
according to area or customer groups with different risk and cost structures; a differentiation 
of terms according to the length and quality of the business relationship, including a difference 
in terms between initial and subsequent repeat loans; an emphasis on small sizes of savings, 
loans and installments; variable but short maturities; frequent instalments; no or short 
grace-periods. 
(vii) Adapting risk management comprises a comprehensive strategy for arrears prevention, 
including appropriate loan and instalment periods; effective collection services; an adequate 
mixture of formal and nonformal collateral and collateral substitutes; reliance on a borrower's 
track record based on savings and previous loan repayment behavior; personal guarantees and 
various forms of joint liability in cooperation with voluntary associations including joint 
liability groups, the latter successfully practiced by BAAC in Thailand and VBA in Vietnam on 
a broad scale; and incentives for timely repayment, e.g. in the form of a substantial interest 
rate rebate as practiced by BRI in Indonesia. 
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(viii) Adapting the manpower and training system requires a selection of staff with 
particular language and social skills, which may be more important than formal certification, 
and inclusion of customer-oriented social behavior, micro loan appraisal, arrears prevention 
etc. in the training curriculum. This may also include exposure training programs for bank 
executives and management in other banks, perhaps in neighboring countries, which can serve 
as examples of successful adaptation. 
Formal financial institutions serve but a fraction of the population, typically within the upper 
quartiles of the social hierarchy. When adapting to requirements of the microfinance 
market, they may gradually expand into the lower quartiles. Within the foreseeable future they 
will normally not be able to fully serve that market. To reach the whole market, the 
institutional adaptation strategy for formal financial institutions (downgrading) must be 
complemented by an upgrading strategy for nonformal financial institutions. The former is a 
top down approach, the latter bottom up. 
5.2. Upgrading: 
Nonformal Finance and the Institutional Enhancement Strategy 
Nonformal finance, which mostly rests on local institutions, comprises those financial sectors 
which are directly accessible to virtually the whole population. There are two principal appro-
aches: (i) organizational development within the framework of their given legal form (which is 
legal according to common law in a given area but extralegal in terms of national law); (ii) 
promoting the transition of an institution to a higher-order legal form, such as a credit 
cooperative or bank. 
These two upgrading approaches may either be directed at primary or secondary organizations: 
(i) enhancing the capacity of grassroots financial institutions including self-help groups and 
people's organizations; or (ii) enhancing the capacity of self-help promoting institutions like 
NGDOs (non-governmental development organizations). 
Self-help groups (SHGs) as member-owned and member-controlled local institutions may 
either be (i) financial groups, with financial intermediation as their primary purpose, such as 
rotating and nonrotating savings and credit assocations; or (ii) nonfinancial groups, with 
financial intermediation as a secondary purpose, such as vendors associations, craft guilds, 
family planning groups and numerous other types of voluntary associations. Their functions 
may include: 
• providing guidance to members 
• collecting savings from members 
• building up an internal loan fund 
• loan appraisal and creditworthiness examination 
• financial consultancy services to members 
• arranging for nonformal collateral or guarantees including joint liability 
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• granting loans to members 
• size and term transformation 
• collecting instalments 
• applying social control mechanisms to enforce repayment 
• granting emergency loans 
• granting nonfinancial emergency assistance 
• providing insurance services 
• communication and exchange of experience 
• providing linkages with banks, NGOs or donors 
• supporting the loan applications of individual members to banks through 
recommendations 
While the activities of SHGs are usually well-adapted to local conditions, they frequently lack 
technical skills, networking capacities and access to sources of refinance. 
The possibility and appropriateness of acquiring bank status by SHGs depends on the legal 
framework and on their financial and organizational maturity. In countries with an appropriate 
legal framework financial SHGs may be assisted in establishing a member-owned and 
member-controlled bank. In countries without such a framework, SHGs may be assisted in 
establishing a semiformal financial institution registered as a non-bank institution until the law 
is changed. In cases where an SHG cannot immediately fulfil the conditions of the banking 
law, acquisition of a non-bank legal status, e.g. under cooperative law, association law, etc., 
may provide an interim solution which permits a SHG to undergo a process of upgrading until 
it is mature and capitalized enough for bank status. In countries with effective savings and 
credit cooperatives the feasibility of converting them into cooperative banks may be examined. 
In countries where cooperatives under the authority of a cooperative department have failed to 
mature into viable financial institutions (e.g., as a result of credit conduiting on behalf of the 
government), rehabilitation with the objective of transforming them into member-owned banks 
under the supervision of the central bank may provide a feasible alternative, which would in 
turn require massive technical assistance. SHGs may also be partial or full owners of local 
banks, as in the case of the Nigerian community Banks (Seibel 1994b). 
Non-governmental, or private voluntary, development organizations (NGDOs, NGOs, 
PVOs) may either be (i) humanitarian organizations, usually relying on donor support, 
working for the benefit of others such as self-help groups and microentrepreneurs or small 
farmers; or (ii) apex and umbrella organizations of financial self-help groups, business 
associations and the like working for the benefit of their own members. The latter may be 
member-owned and member-directed; the former, as a rule, are not. Examples of the latter are 
regional and national federations of credit cooperatives, craft unions or market vendors 
associations. While their start-up phase may be donor-supported, they are to be financially 
self-reliant in the long run, drawing on their own resources and those of their members. 
16 
NGDOs acting directly as financial intermediaries or working through financial self-help 
groups may have two basic functions: (i) guidance, training and consultancy in financial and 
nonfinancial matters; (ii) acting as a financial intermediary between microentrepreneurs or 
their self-help groups and donors or banks. 
The activities of NGDOs as financial intermediaries may include any of the following: 
• financial extension services 
• bookkeeping training 
• financial management training 
•promotion of innovative savings schemes, e.g. daily or doorstep savings collection in 
the informal sector, withdrawable voluntary savings as well as time deposits in self-help 
groups (SHGs), etc. 
• internal resource mobilization through debt instruments (e.g., titulo de credit of Genesis 
Empresario, a credit NGO in Guatemala not authorized to mobilize conventional savings) 
• mediating contacts with a bank or donor 
• collecting and safekeeping savings 
• depositing savings of microentrepreneurs of SHGs in a bank 
• examining the creditworthiness of microentrepreneurs or SHGs 
• negotiating bank loans for microentrepreneurs or SHGs 
• onlending to microentrepreneurs or SHGs 
• collecting installments from microentrepreneurs or SHGs 
• bearing the credit risk 
• repaying bank loans 
NGDOs not acting as financial intermediaries may still carry out several of these functions, 
except accepting savings and entering into loan contracts. For NGDOs acting directly or 
indirectly as financial intermediaries it is mandatory to possess an adequate accounting system, 
financial management skills and financial reserves to absorb arrears and bear the risk. They 
should also strive for external auditing of their books. For NGDOs which strengthen financial 
capacities of microentrepreneurs or SH Gs it is mandatory to possess adequate training and 
consultancy capacities. This in turn requires major institutional enhancement inputs from 
donors, as many NGDOs lack the required skills and capacities. 
NGDOs acting as financial intermediaries operate under precarious economic and legal 
conditions. Legal constraints keep them from offering a full range of financial services, 
particularly the collection of savings; easy money lures many, though not all, into donor-
dependency; absence of supervision keep them from having their books audited; lack of 
performance pressures and banking skills makes them unviable. 
Llanto and Chua (1996) examined the transaction costs of two NGOs in the Philippines, 
which they found exorbitant: 34.0% of loans outstanding in one and 83.5% in the other case; 
they compared unfavorably with private rural banks (12.1 %), cooperative rural banks (7.5%), 
credit cooperatives (6.3%) and of course private commercial banks (8.0%) as well as 
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specialized government banks (10.03) with their much larger loan sizes. (McGuire & Conroy 
1997:79). Do NGOs promote savings in any significant way? Almeyda (1996:117-118) found, 
no, unlike ROSCAs, they don't, except "NGOs that have evolved into new formal financial 
intermediaries". However, if cheap donor funds continue to be supplied generously, as in the 
case of the Grameen Bank (Yunus 1997), the mobilization of internal resources in the form of 
voluntary savings may be discarded as too expensive. 
To put their operations on a sound legal footing, they may formalize their financial activities 
and governance structure in one of the following ways: (i) contribute first to the bankability of 
their target group (individuals or SHGs) and then turn their financial operations over to 
suitable banks while specializing on training and consultancy services; (ii) establish their own 
bank operating along sound banking principles (usually as a subsidiary); (iii) establish a bank 
jointly with the SHGs or microentrepreneurs and small farmers under their guidance. In the 
latter case the NGDO may either consider its engagement in banking permanent or transitory, 
with the intention of eventually turning ownership and management over to the SHGs or 
microentrepreneurs. 
The upgrading of nonformal financial institutions or operations of NGDOs and SHGs into 
private or cooperative banks which operate along sound banking criteria may be a major field 
of financial or technical assistance. The operational details of SHG upgrading are presented in 
a modular training manual (Seibel 1992a). One of the most prominent recent examples of an 
NGO turned bank is BancoSol in Bolivia (Gonzalez-Vega et al. 1996). Since the institutional 
deregulation of 1988, there has been a variety of NGO banks in Indonesia (e.g., by Bina 
Swadaya, Duta Bina Bhuana, Maha Bogha Marga, Purba Danarta) which may serve as models 
(Seibel 1997a). With the passing of a development banking act in Nepal, Grameen-type NGOs 
are now being replaced by Grameen-type development banks (Seibel 1997b). 
As MFls are upgraded from nonformal to formal, regulation and supervision become issues 
of increasing importance (Rock & Otero, 1997). Given their large number and diversity, 
central banks or bank superintendencies (Christen 1997:47) may not be well suited for their 
effective supervision. MFis may therefore be well-advised to establish networks with their own 
second-tier regulatory authority, with effective off- and on-site mechanisms, as in Peru and 
Bolivia (Berenbach & Chruchill 1997:49-55), Nigeria (Seibel 1994b) and developed countries 
such as Germany with its long tradition of differentiated second-tier supervision of 
commercial, cooperative and savings banks under a single credit law. 
5.3. Linking: 
Formal and Nonformal Finance and the Linkage Strategy 
The linkage banking strategy focusses on the establishment of business relations between 
formal and nonformal financial institutions, the latter encompassing endogenous and exogenous 
self-help groups. It first emerged from spontaneous local initiatives in Africa which found the 
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attention of researchers, the FAQ and GTZ (Seibel 1984, 1985, 1987; Seibel, Dedy, Herwegen 
& Kadja 1987; Seibel & Marx 1987). In 1986, the strategy gained momentum when it was 
adopted by the Asian and Pacific Regional and Agricultural Credit Association (APRACA) as 
lead agency, resulting in pilot projects in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Nepal 
(Acharchya et al. 1990; ADB 1990:209-211; APRACA 1996; Conroy et al. 1995; Ghate 
1992:184-192; Kropp et al. 1989; Kropp & Quinones 1992; Kropp & Clar de Jesus 1996; 
Seibel 1989; Seibel & Parhusip 1992). The approach is now spreading to other countries in 
Asia including India where NABARD applies the approach on a broad national scale and, 
through AFRACA (1996), in Africa. Nagaranjan & Meyer (1996) have shown how rotating 
savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) in Gambia have been successfully linked to NGO 
banks. In the 1989 World Development Report linkage banking was recommended as a 
promising strategy of financial system development: 
Informal financial institutions have proved able to serve the household, agricultural, 
and microenterprise sectors on a sustained basis. Measures that link informal 
institutions to the formal financial system will improve that service and ensure a 
competitive environment (p. iv; cf. p. 119). 
Departing from the transaction cost problem the linkage strategy focusses on self-help groups 
as grassroots retailers mediating between banks and the vast numbers of microentrepreneurs 
and small farmers to cut down on transaction costs for both banks and customers. The linkage 
strategy also encompasses measures of upgrading nonformal financial institutions and the 
institutional adaptation of banks. Several guiding principles have emerged: 
• Working through existing formal and informal institutions 
• Institutional autonomy 
• Promoting savings mobilization 
• Promoting credit delivery at market rates 
• Linking savings and credit 
• Substituting group liability and nonformal for physical collateral 
• Ensuring institutional viability by covering the costs from the margin 
• Sound banking practices 
In the implementation the linkage strategy is designed to participatively initiate linkage 
processes, rather than prescribe specific models. Any specific schemes are to be the outcome 
of participative processes among the respective participants. There are two principal linkage 
dimensions: (i) institutional linkages between SHGs and banks, which may either be indirect 
through self-help promoting institutions as intermediaries; or direct; and (ii) financial linkages 
(reciprocity) between savings and credit, either in fixed ratios, with the amount of credit 
contingent upon the amount of savings, or in dynamic ratios, with the amount of credit 
increasing with the number of successful repayment cycles, ensuring a gradual growth of the 
balance between credit and borrower capacity to save, invest and repay. 
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After the abismal record of subsidized targeted group lending lending schemes in the past, such 
as BIMAS in Indonesia, linkage banking has frequently been regarded with suspicion. Is the 
performance of schemes in which existing self-help groups with internal savings and credit 
activities are linked to banks different from those in which the Government establishes groups 
as credit channels?3 In India Puhazhendhi (1995) found that linkage banking raised repayment 
rates from 34. 7 % to 97. 2 3 At the same time bank transaction costs fell from $3. 68 per loan 
(held constant at $170 across models) in individual lending to a low of $2.19 in loans to SHGs 
as financial intermediaries; transaction costs were between these two figures when banks lent 
directly to individuals involving SH Gs and NGOs as nonfinancial intermediaries ($2. 72) and 
when banks lent to NGOs who in turn lent to SHGs as retailers ($2.85). The impact on 
borrower transaction costs was found to be more substantial: amounting to $9.40 per loan in 
individual lending without NGO and SHG involvement, $5.70 in direct bank lending to 
individuals with NGO and SHG involvement as nonfinancial intermediaries; $1.40 in bank 
lending to SHGs with NGOs involved as nonfinancial intermediaries; and $1.25 in bank 
lending to NGOs who in turn lend to SHGs as retailers. (McGuire & Conroy 1997) The overall 
conclusion is that linkage banking can be an effective transition facilitator (Remenyi 1997) 
between banks and microborrowers who may eventually graduate to direct access to banks 
(unless they decide to upgrade their SHG to a formal sector MFI). As a result of NABARD's 
facilitation of linkage banking, substantially more banks in India now lend to 
microentrepreneurs and small farmers; and substantially more poor people have access to bank 
services. 
Institutional linkages between banks and SHGs may proceed in an evolutionary sequence of 
three steps: from indirect linkages to direct linkages and ultimately to direct access of 
microentrepreneurs to banking services - with the proviso that SHGs might also evolve into 
local banks servicing their members directly. Between these stages, there may be intermediate 
steps, with NGOs or SHGs, respectively, in a consultative role. It is important not to ignore 
these transition dynamics, which were part of the model from its onset (Seibel 1985), and not 
to blindly replicate the approach as if linkage banking, like Grameen banking, were a panacea. 
5.4. Innovating: 
The Infrastructural Innovation Strategy 
Infrastructural innovation, i.e. the establishment of new local financial institutions, can be an 
appropriate approach where no suitable institutions exist or existing institutions cannot be 
upgraded or adjusted to local requirements. If approaches of downgrading, upgrading or 
31 am not arguing that government agencies are unable to channel credit through groups efficiently. With the 
right incentives and price signals, a reasonable performance can be attained. An example is P4K in Indonesia, an 
IFAD- and UNDP-supported government project, in which BRI has supplied credit to some 40,000 small farmer 
groups (12/1996) on the condition it would make a profit in the process, which BRI claims it did. (Seibel 1996:59-
62; 1997a) 
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linkage banking are found inadequate in coping with local demands, infrastructural innovation 
can also serve as a complementary or competitive strategy and contribute to institutional 
differentiation. 
There are three basic requirements for viable and sustainable institutional innovations in 
microfinance on a competitive market: (i) they must be demand-driven, i.e. respond to felt 
needs and articulated demands for financial services; (ii) they must be savings-driven, both in 
the interest of institutions and their customers as savers; (iii) they must cover their costs from 
the margin. In addition to commercial and developing banks which may be downgraded, there 
are three types of local institutions facing the challenge of these requirements: 
• community-based financial institutions which are owned and controlled by a local 
community 
• member-based financial institutions owned and controlled by their members. 
•privately owned institutions, such as rural shareholding banks and finance 
companies. 
Mixed ownership is of course also possible, e.g. comprising owners such als members of the 
local community, local, provincial and national Government, and NGOs. 
Community and member-based institutions4 are normally small local institutions, but 
member-based institutions may also have a wider, potentially national, outreach. An example is 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, a national institution which is 80% member-owned and 20% 
government-owned. Starting from small and semiformal project origins, it now links informal 
groups as grassroots intermediaries to a complex formal bank branch network. Another 
example are the community banks in Nigeria, which are independent local institutions forming 
part of a national network under their own national regulatory institution and regional 
representative offices. Examples of private banks with sustainable microfinance services are 
the Northern Mindanao Development Bank in the Philippines, Bank Shinta Daya and Bank 
Dagang Bali, both in Indonesia. 
Given the proximity of community- and member-based institutions to the grassroots level and 
their amenability to local control, the two types of institutions face particular risks and cope 
with problems arising from social stratification and inequality in different ways. 
Community-based as well as private financial institutions tend to integrate different classes, 
risking unequal access to services and an internal transfer of resources from the poor to the 
wealthy. Depending on the volition of the members, member-based financial institutions may 
or may not integrate different classes, running the danger of adverse selection. Appropriate 
coping strategies are a reinforcement of democratic control through carefully selected boards 
4ln Germany, community-owned savings banks (Sparkassen) and member-owned cooperative banks 
(Raijfeisenbanken, Volksbanken), which evolved from informal beginnings in the early 19th century, today 
account for 50. 9 % of all loans and 77. 2 % of all savings [December 1993]: one of the biggest and most 
successful network of microfinance institutions in the world. 
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(which may be advisory, supervisory or management boards) in the former and of professional 
management in the latter case. An appropriate balance between democratic control and 
professional management will present a permanent challenge to any cooperative banking 
system, considered by some a (mostly social) strength and by other a (mostly economic) 
weakness: at present a hotly debated issue in the German cooperative banking system. 
Depending on national and local circumstances new institutions may be established in the 
formal, semiformal or informal financial sectors. New formal financial institutions may be set 
up in cooperation with the central bank or major national, regional or provincial banks, 
including development banks and banks with a rural mandate, as facilitators or intermediaries, 
seconded perhaps by well-prepared NGOs in their capacity as training and consultancy 
agencies. New semiformal financial institutions which include cooperatives and GO and 
NGO-supported financial programs, may be established through cooperative or NGO networks 
and apex organizations which need to be adequately qualified for that task. Group-based 
informal financial institutions may be set up in cooperation with NGOs and cooperatives, 
usually through their respective networks and apexes, which in turn have to provide adequate 
training and facilities to their member institutions. Under favorable conditions government 
institutions may also succeed in establishing financial self-help groups, as in the case of the 
P4K project of the Department of Agriculture in Indonesia; between 1990 and 1996 it has set 
up 4 7, 500 small groups, provided access to bank credit (at a repayment rate of 97. 5 % of credit 
disbursed and 90.4% of credit outstanding as of 12/1996) and inspired processes of 
institutional self-reliance through the mobilization of savings and the formation of close to 
2,000 associations (Seibel 1997a). 
The sequencing of infrastructural innovation should be planned and implemented with a view 
towards the other three institutional strategies as complementary or successive strategies. In 
countries with an inappropriate policy environment and a lack of adaptable institutions 
intervention may start with infrastructural innovations at the informal or semiformal level; to 
be followed in another phase by upgrading within the nonformal framework; next by 
infrastructural upgrading of the most successful institutions to semiformal institutions and 
eventually banks; then by linkages between nonformal and formal institutions; and finally by a 
general transition to formal institutions. Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is one of the most 
impressive examples. 
Decisions concerning the most effective strategy, level and approach are best left to 
competitive market forces rather than government or donor authority. 
6. Supportive Strategies and Sound (Best) Practices 
Strategies supportive of institutional adjustment are important at the policy and instrumental 
level. A friendly, deregulated policy environment with an appropriate legal framework will 
greatly facilitate any approach to institutional adjustment. In a less than friendly or even hostile 
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environment, two supporting strategies may be feasible: (i) niche-seeking in the short run and 
(ii) policy reform in the medium or long run. Experience from pre-deregulation Indonesia 
shows that even within an inappropriate policy environment financial services can be viable at 
the grassroots level. Examples are BKK in Central Java and LPN in West-Sumatra (Malhotra 
1992; Seibel 1989; Seibel 1996). 
A successful institutional adjustment strategy must encompass a sound instrumental 
innovation strategy, which in turn comprises improved or new financial products, good 
procedures and effective contractual terms and conditions, which may be summed up as 
banking according to sound commercial principles. This applies to any sector, formal or 
nonformal. Certain, but not all, instrumental strategies, such as the ability of a bank in the 
formal financial sector to cover its costs from the margin, will depend on the policy 
environment, specifically on the existence or absence of interest rate ceilings. But in 
government-approved niches or in the nonformal sector virtually any strategy can be 
implemented regardless of the regulatory environment (though perhaps at a special cost for the 
circumvention of existing regulation). 
Microsavings products and innovations to be promoted may comprise convenient deposit 
facilities for the accumulation and safeguarding of savings for microenterprise self-financing, 
consumption and emergencies; positive real returns to prevent erosion by inflation; savings 
products that differ in yield, maturity and incentive structure, such as voluntary savings 
withdrawable at any time or fixed deposits vs. self-imposed regular compulsory savings that 
are non-withdrawable, lottery savings or raffles; debt instruments (titulo credito) for the 
mobilization of internal resources by institutions not authorized to mobilize savings deposits; 
and collection services organized by institutions or customer groups, such as doorstep daily 
savings collection. In subsistence agriculture and marginal informal sector activities where 
virtually any type of credit may be inappropriate savings promotion that strengthens the 
self-financing capacity can be the only responsible financial strategy. 
Microcredit products may be appropriately differentiated in terms of maturities, instalments, 
services and collateral requirements (ranging from joint liability and personal guarantees to 
tangible collateral and pawning), rather than in terms of loan use, which is costly to appraise 
and, for fungibility reasons, difficult to control. Viable and sustainable microcredit schemes 
require: prudent adjustment to household savings, investment and repayment capacities; small 
loan sizes, with ceilings growing over a cycle of repeat loans up to a level determined by the 
absorptive capacity of the microenterprise and household economy; dynamically growing 
savings-to-credit ratios; market rates of interest autonomously determined by financial 
institutions and differentiated according to costs and services provided; loan maturities and 
repayment modalities according to customer needs and differentiated, in case of wholesaling, 
according for each level of intermediation; short maturities, no grace periods and short 
instalment periods in case of initial loans; insistence on, and incentives for, timely repayment; 
and the development and provision of cost-effective monitoring systems. 
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Product reciprocity ties credit to savings, improves savings discipline and establishes a track 
record for otherwise unbankable customers, thus offering an inexpensive solution to the 
information problem. 
Through collection reciprocity an institution may combine the collection of savings with the 
collection of instalments, which can be crucial to arrears prevention in the informal sector 
where incomes are daily or irregular, but not monthly, and are likely to escape collection 
without appropriate collection techniques. Recovery rates can be further improved by tied 
lending, interlinking credit with commodity transactions: a widespread practice in the 
nonf01mal sector that can also be successfully applied by formal institutions. 
Microfinance procedures and services should be (i) set by financial institutions rather than 
government; (ii) customer-oriented, i.e. simple, fast and on time; (iii) market-oriented and in 
competition with those by other formal or nonformal institutions; and (iv) cost-covering. These 
principles should be applied with the objective of attaining: (i) sound financial management, 
(ii) convenient and safe savings collection and deposit facilities, (iii) appropriate loan appraisal 
and processing procedures, (iv) adequate risk management (including collateral substitutes, 
nonformal collateral, loan protection schemes and prudent loan disbursement), (v) effective 
monitoring and repayment collection and (vii) effective information gathering, all of which 
may include cooperation between different formal and nonformal intermediaries in fields where 
each is most effective. 
Terms and conditions of financial contracts must be sound from both an institution's and its 
customers' viewpoints. To arrive at balanced loan contracts an exchange of experience and 
mutual learning may be required between the various types of nonformal and formal 
institutions including: (i) informal financial institutions with their wide range of contractual 
terms concerning interest rates, loan sizes, maturities, grace periods, loan purposes, 
reciprocities, collateral requirements, services, transaction cost sharing arrangements and 
unbounded innovations; (ii) semiformal financial institutions including projects and programs, 
which tend to be influenced by governmental or non-governmental donors and may combine 
comprehensive services with a lack of commercial orientation; (iii) formal institutions on 
tightly regulated markets, with a narrow and usually inflexible range of contractual terms; and 
(iv) formal institutions on deregulated markets with their much wider range of terms, tran-
saction cost sharing arrangements and innovations. Ultimately savers and borrowers must be 
regarded as a market for financial institutions, with the institutions as intermediaries and savers 
and borrowers as customers rather than beneficiaries. Contractual terms and conditions on that 
market are to be the result of negotiation and competition rather than administrative imposition 
and convenience. In this regard, it is up to the microfinance institutions and their business 
associations to articulate their demand for changes in the policy and legal environment, in bank 
supervision, and in training and consultancy services to be provided on a national level - rather 
than leaving this to imposition from the Central Bank and the IMF and their good intentions. 
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